

WEST INDIES AND SOUTH AMERICA	144,775	per cent of her exported rice went to the same places, and
GERMANY	8,807	there has been little change since then. The boycott of
ENGLAND	6,587	Siamese rice reduced, then, China's share in her total
EUROPE, EXCLUDING THE ABOVE TWO COUNTRIES ..	21,686	export of rice by some 15 per cent. When it is remembered
SOUTH AFRICA	13,179	that the boycott did not start until June, which means the
CEYLON	127,677	boycott was in force for only less than four months of the
INDIA	29,865	nine-month period considered, the success is all the more
OTHER COUNTRIES	5,408	astonishing.
TOTAL	1,131,480	

This means that during the first nine months last year rice exported by Siam to Singapore, Hongkong and China constituted only approximately 60 per cent of her total rice export. But in 1930 it was officially stated that 75

per cent of her exported rice went to the same places, and there has been little change since then. The boycott of Siamese rice reduced, then, China's share in her total export of rice by some 15 per cent. When it is remembered that the boycott did not start until June, which means the boycott was in force for only less than four months of the nine-month period considered, the success is all the more astonishing.

Little wonder then that the Siamese government sent a special envoy to China (stationed in Hongkong) to improve Sino-Siamese trade relations. Time would seem ripe for China to make another overture to the Siamese government to start negotiations for the establishment of treaty relationship between the two countries.

Main Issues Between Siam and China

By LIN YU (林幽)

THE history of China's attempts to establish treaty relations with Siam dates back to the reign of Emperor Kwang Hsu of the Ching dynasty, and during the republic several overtures were made with the same object in view. These attempts ended in failure, because the Siamese government has adopted a policy of procrastination. However, at one time it signified its willingness to start negotiations, provided that the questions to be discussed are known beforehand. The time seems ripe, as pointed out in the previous article, for China to make another overture to the Siamese government. It is therefore important that we know what are the issues involved. The two foregoing articles on the causes of, and the specific measures adopted by, the anti-Chinese movement in Siam give us some insight to the question, but in view of their importance it is necessary to treat these issues separately. Briefly there are four specific issues and one fundamental one. The specific issues are the nationality of Siam-born Chinese, the education of Chinese children in Siam, the protection of the economic investment of oversea Chinese in Siam, and the question of immigration, while the fundamental problem is a change in the attitude of both the Chinese and Siamese towards each other. All these problems have to be solved, if China and Siam are to settle down peacefully as neighbors.

First, let us take up the problem of nationality, on which the settlement of the question of the education of Chinese children and that of the treatment of oversea Chinese in general hinges. As the situation obtains at present, Siam claims Chinese children born in Siam as Siamese, on the principle of *jus soli*, while China claims them on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, and both countries claim the right to educate them after their own systems of education. If this problem is solved, then there is a principle on which we may base the solution of the education problem. Similarly the treatment of our compatriots in Siam also depends, in a large measure, upon the same question. Being the nationals of a non-treaty country with Siam, the Chinese are regarded as Siamese nationals upon landing. Time was this was not without its special privileges, such as the ownership of land, etc., but recently such privileges

are, we are reliably informed, fast disappearing. On the other hand, they are subject to poll tax, conscription, etc., too. The settlement of this question is therefore of paramount importance.

We may settle this issue with Siam by bringing it before the League of Nations, apart from negotiations for the establishment of treaty relations. There is a prevalent misconception that the question of enforcing nationality law is a matter of a state's internal administration and beyond the reach of the League. This is decidedly not the case. In 1922 France and her protectorate, Tunis, tried to enforce the nationality law based on the *jus soli* principle, making the children born of British parentage in Tunis either Tunisians or French. Britain protested and tried to bring up the question for arbitration, but in vain. The British then in 1923 brought the dispute before the League Council, and owing to French opposition, the Council requested the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague to give its expert opinion whether the enforcement of nationality law was a matter of a state's internal administration and therefore a problem beyond the competency of the League to handle. The Court returned the verdict that it was not. The Council therefore accepted the case. That the question was settled outside the League need not concern us here. What is important to us is that the League has set a precedence in handling such a dispute, and we may bring the case before the League, should Siam prove unduly obdurate toward a settlement of the question.

The actual settlement of the Tunis case should also prove suggestive of the solution. The first generation of the British progeny remains British, while the second generation becomes either French or Tunisians. We may reach a similar settlement with Siam so that the children born of Chinese parentage in Siam will remain Chinese, while their grandchildren will become Siamese. An alternative solution would be to leave the choice of nationality to the children when they come of age. The first solution is preferable because it settles the question definitely in a clear cut way and there can be no dispute

over the question whether the children of dual nationality should be given Chinese or Siamese education.

Next we come to the problem of investment by the Chinese in Siam. Because of the contributions our compatriots have made to Siam in the past and because of the peculiar position they hold in Siam's economic structure at present, the economic prosperity of the Chinese augurs well for the welfare of the Siamese nation. As the Siamese government has taken an unfavorable attitude towards the Chinese, it has become imperative for the Chinese government to reach with the Siamese government some sort of guarantee of the economic status of Chinese business men, industrialists and laborers. The labor laws must go. They are unwise, because while the Siamese government cannot enforce them, they do cause no small amount of ill feeling between the two peoples.

One aspect of the economic status of our industrialists in Siam which deserves special attention is the ownership of land. Only one-twentieth of Siam's land is under cultivation. Development on a big scale is out of the question, because she has no money and experts to put the scheme to work. For development on a small scale she needs the industrious Chinese. For this service as well as for their services in the past it seems only right that the Chinese be given the special privilege of owning the land, as they have hitherto been enjoying to the great benefit of both the Chinese and the Siamese.

Finally there is the problem of immigration and domicile. The landing tax, the process fee, the tax for the right of domicile have for their objectives not only to bar Chinese laborers and women from entry into Siam, but also to increase government revenue. In the first objective they have succeeded only too well, but in the second they have failed miserably. As pointed out in one of the preceding articles, before the enforcement of the 1933 immigration law each steamer from Swatow brought several hundred or even over 1,000 passengers, but after its enforcement each steamer brings only a score or so each trip and many of them cannot land! This means that formerly when one steamer docked at Bangkok the immigration office collected some 37,450 *bahts* (taking each steamer as carrying on the average 700 persons each trip and each person who landed must pay 35.50 *bahts* for the landing tax, the process fee and the domicile tax), but now when a steamer docks at Bangkok, the immigration office cannot collect more than 2,470 *bahts* (taking each steamer now as carrying only 20 passengers each trip and each of them has to pay 123.50 *bahts* for the same purposes), which means a loss of 34,980 *bahts*, when one steamer makes one trip from China to Siam. Surely these figures are worth the attention of the Siamese government.

Nevertheless the reduction of the taxes which Chinese immigrants have to pay, or the mere lightening of other restrictions, is not enough to induce the Chinese people to migrate to Siam. She must offer them opportunities as well. And opportunities she has to offer aplenty. The small percentage of her land under cultivation surely shows that there is still room enough for both the Siamese and many more Chinese to live on it comfortably. In answer to the motion of non-confidence in the Siamese

THE LITTLE CRITIC

EDITED BY LIN YUTANG

An Open Reply to Randall Gould

Dear Mr. Gould,

I have read your open letter to me in *The China Critic* with great interest, and am only sorry that I hadn't seen it before it came out, otherwise I would certainly have written a postscript. However, I am making up for it now:

Now, do you call yourself my friend when you suggest that I should write a satiric novel about contemporary China? Of course, you have also kindly mentioned that I should exercise a self-censorship and "catch myself by the neck with both hands and choke myself at times, lest someone else apply a garotte to the job in more conclusive fashion." Very kind of you, Mr. Gould. I love my own skin.

But the trouble is, your suggestion is really so tempting, and I am fearing that the idea will not leave me alone. I want you to know that, even if I never come to write such a book, I heartily approve of your brilliant idea. Or perhaps shall I suggest this idea to some good Chinese writers and let them do the job? I am merely throwing out a few hints to support your statement that there is no lack of material in contemporary China for such a picaresque novel. As I have already indicated in my book, there are plenty of "rogues" to be made heroes in such a satirical novel. In fact, *Lun Yu*, the humorous magazine that I founded and edited, lives and prospers by merely scanning the most innocent surface of the doings of such rogues. All of them love their

parliament, the Minister of Economic Affairs pleaded the failure to carry out many of the government projects on the ground that both money and expert personnel were sorely needed. And yet they are doing everything possible to antagonize the people who control 70 to 80 per cent of their national economy, because of their anti-Chinese sentiments.

This leads to the fundamental issue involved — that of the attitude of the Siamese leaders. Their attitude as revealed above is anything but sane, though there is a cause for it. However, the difference between statesmen and politicians lies just in this: while a statesman is able to rise above his personal feelings, a politician is ever seeking to satisfy his own desires. The situation in Siam demands the cooperation between the two peoples, while the personal feeling of their leaders leads to antagonism. It remains to be seen whether or not the leaders of the Siamese nation are statesmen.

On the other hand, the Chinese people, too, must change their attitude toward the Siamese. They are reaping today what they sowed yesterday, and looking toward tomorrow, it would be well for them to behave wisely now before it is too late.